

INTRODUCTION

The history of Germany in the twentieth century divides into two epochs, which could not be more different from each other. The first half of the century was characterised by wars and catastrophes, the counterparts of which the world had never seen before. Germany occupied the central point in these events, and the most frightful crimes in human history have since then been associated with its name. The second half of the century, on the other hand, led finally to a degree of political stability, freedom and well-being which had appeared in 1945 to be utterly unattainable. The problem of how the two halves of the twentieth century are historically related in Germany represents the first strand in the argument of this book. If a symbolic date has to be assigned to the transition from one epoch to the other, it should perhaps be the summer of 1942, when with the opening of 'Aktion Reinhard' the systematic murder of almost all Polish Jews began and at the same time the mass deportation of Jews from Western Europe to Auschwitz was set in motion. How the development of Germany from the economic and cultural blossoming of the country around the turn of the century could lead to this low point is one question. The other question is how the Germans found their way out of this apocalypse in the sixty years that followed.

Nevertheless, people did not know what would happen in the summer of 1942 fifteen or twenty years before the event. They couldn't even have suspected it. Nor could the anti-Semites and the National Socialists, who were relatively few in number at that time. This fact draws a boundary around the question 'How could it come to that?' by pointing to the openness of the historical process, to the alternatives and the numerous byways and detours of history. The First World War was still avoidable to June 1914. At the Reichstag elections of 20 May 1928 the National Socialists obtained no more than 2.6 percent of the vote. As late as the autumn of 1939, the fate of the European Jews was still uncertain. Anyone who only seeks to discover the previous history of the problems of the present or the various different presents of the past is operating with a hidden teleology, which obscures developments which were cut short, ended in failure or simply petered out.

The course of events between the turn of the century and the apocalypse of mass murder was not predetermined, although the forces pushing in that direction were plainly visible. Nor was there any greater degree of inevitability about the recovery of liberty and well-being after 1945, first in the western part of Germany, then in the whole country..

Bearing in mind Germany's industrial potential it was not out of the question that an economic boom could take place, although few people believed this in view of the level of mass destruction at the end of the war. But that it would once again be possible to awaken a sense of democracy, the rule of law and human dignity in this nation and its leadership and to give this a lasting character appeared to be almost out of the question. The slow transformation which we can trace in the case of the Federal Republic from a society moulded by National Socialism into an increasingly western and liberal society is one of the most remarkable developments of the century. Indeed, the more clearly we see the actual weight of the burden imposed by the personal and mental legacy of the Nazi dictatorship, the more remarkable it becomes.

The second half of the century was divided in its turn. This was a division between East and West. As a result, people who lived in the eastern part of Germany only had an opportunity at the end of the century to share in the freedom and well-being of the West Germans. After 1945, people in the West fared much better than their counterparts in the East, even if this was not of their own doing, but resulted rather from the vagaries of fate and the decisions of the Occupying Powers. It soon appeared as if the Germans in the east of the country had to bear the consequences of the war by themselves. In this context, the history of the GDR was related more, not less, strongly to the year 1945 than that of the Federal Republic, as a product of the occupation policies of the victorious power, the Soviet Union, but also as a reaction by the German communists to fascism and war. The present book is in no sense a comparative history of the two German states, but it is impossible to deny that their relations, entanglements and antagonisms play as great a role here as the differences and similarities between them.

Without a doubt, the first strand of argument followed here bears an exclusively German signature. German history in this century differs from the history of all other countries, and cannot simply be subsumed under European history. Nevertheless, it is *also* a part of European history, hence the second strand of the book's argument is in conflict with the first, because it arches over the caesura of the year 1945.

This second strand of our argument is intimately connected with the rise of industrial society in the two decades before the First World War and the repercussions of this fundamental transformation for the economy, the society, the culture and particularly the politics of twentieth-century Germany. After the turn of the century, the immanent tendencies of industrialisation were no longer restricted to specific groups and a minority of regions, as they had been in previous decades. Instead, they transformed the lives of

almost *all* people. Moreover, this took place within the lifetime of one generation and its impact was more far-reaching than had ever been seen in previous history.

The intensity and dynamism of these changes confronted contemporaries with extraordinary challenges. The political, social and cultural movements which emerged in the decades that followed, adopting highly radical positions, should be understood above all as attempts to react and respond to these challenges, which were perceived as previously unimaginable advances, but at the same time as symptoms of a profound and existential crisis of bourgeois society. Subsequent decades were moulded by the reaction to these tremendous changes, expressed in the search for a way of ordering politics and society which would promise to combine security and dynamic development, equality and continuing growth.

The First World War, the inflation and particularly the world economic crisis led the liberal capitalist model to lose its legitimacy and persuasiveness in Germany. It found that it was faced with competition from radical left and right wing alternatives, which set the principle of unity against plurality, and countered diversity with dichotomies which were based on the categories of class or race. Large stretches of twentieth-century German history can be understood as the narrative of this competition between rival social and political models. At the same time, National Socialism and Communism did not embody 'anti-modern' social formations but rather proposals for a different way of organising the modern world, in which the liberal triad of the free economy, open society and belief in universal human values was disrupted in the ways specific to each movement. Both movements should be understood as shorthand answers to the dynamic changes that had taken place since the turn of the century. These answers were rendered more radical by the experiences of the First World War and the confrontation between the two competing proposals for a new social order.

After the Second World War, the principles of liberal and democratic capitalism were re-activated by the victory of the West, especially the USA, with its superior military and economic strength. In Germany, as over the whole of Europe, these principles developed a force of attraction which could hardly have been imagined during the 1930s. But it was only in the 1950s, when the free market economy and the liberal system had proved to be stable and successful, that the liberal option really won the upper hand. In the shape of the 'social market economy' it was clearly in competition with the conception of Soviet socialism dominant in the GDR, and it was closely bound up with the global confrontation of the Cold War.

In West Germany, as in most other Western European societies, a model gradually took shape in which capitalism was integrated with the social state. Liberal ideas were combined with ever broader conceptions of planning, and a focus on the nation-state was combined with an involvement in European integration. All this was understood in terms of an explicit and coherent narrative of progress, which continued throughout this time to be focused on the challenges of the industrial society which had emerged during the late nineteenth century. Classical industrial society reached its zenith in the 1960s, but afterwards it increasingly declined in strength and prestige. Until that date heavy industry and mass industrial employment had occupied an unchallenged position, but this now began to slide. The model of industrial progress came up against its limits, both in the West, where mines, steelworks and shipyards began to close, and in the GDR and the other lands of the Soviet empire. In the latter case, the social and political order was completely oriented towards heavy industry and mass employment and the erosion of classical industrial society caused its collapse. The liberal capitalism of the West proved to be more flexible and after the 1970s it was able to adapt to the new conditions of the post-industrial era. Since then a painful process of transformation has allowed the beginnings of a new formation to emerge, characterised by the provision of services, the globalisation of the economy and the return of traditional market-based models, with an outcome which is by and large unknown.

This second strand of the argument makes it possible for us to grasp the years between 1890 and 1990, the years of 'high modernity', as a historical unity, despite the frequent political disruptions they underwent, and to relate the very diverse individual developments in economics, politics, society and culture with one another. This allows us to decipher the links between the first and second halves of the century without relying exclusively on the two world wars, the Nazi dictatorship, the GDR regime and the triumph of socially renewed and democratic capitalism.

It will already be clear from this short sketch that we are dealing here with trans-national processes; and that our decision to concentrate on the history of Germany very much requires justification. Until a few years ago the situation was different, because the interest of the public and of modern historians in this country was almost self-evidently directed towards contemporary German history. The sequence of German Empire, First World War, 1918 revolution, Weimar democracy, National Socialist dictatorship, Second World War, Holocaust and finally division and eventual reunification of Germany contained such a wealth of dramatic and large-scale events with such far-reaching consequences (and unexplained connections) that as a rule twentieth-century history meant

German history. There is no doubt that Europe's twentieth century cannot be understood without a detailed knowledge of German history. And even if one approaches all attempts to construct a historico-political identity with the deepest mistrust, especially when they proceed from the fiction of naturally given units, one still possesses a living cultural attachment to the country in which one grew up and where one resides, and to its history.

But it is anachronistic to regard a concentration on national history as a matter of course, even if the manifold attempts that have been made to get away from German history and its consequences by asserting a European or universal identity can be recognised as an evasion of responsibility. The constant use of categories such as 'industrial society', urbanisation, imperialism, migration or 'Cold War' shows that the history of the twentieth century cannot be decoded nationally. This point applies specifically and very strongly to Germany.

This leads us back to the two overarching strands of argument which cover the present work, and which also make it clear that Germany's twentieth century cannot be summarised by employing a single thesis. Such an approach would be at variance with the multiplicity and contrariety of the movements involved, as well as the unclarity and above all the contingent character of the developments investigated here. But there are some guiding threads we can follow for considerable time-periods: the issue already mentioned of the relation between industrial society and the political order is one of them, and there are several others, such as the rise and decline of radical German nationalism, the relation between the culture of modernity and mass society, the dynamics of violence and war, the relation between the Self and the Other, and the tendency of developed industrial societies to converge. In this context the attempt will be made to integrate the different fields of investigation, classically defined as politics, society, the economy and culture, and to demonstrate the connections between them. Culture will be understood here in the broad sense, as the reflection and the working out of social processes in art, science, public debate and ways of life.

In any case, the contradictory diversity of the twentieth century is also evident from the author's attempts to choose a catchy title for this book. Those attempts all failed, because they inevitably led to a one-size-fits-all approach. There was perhaps one exception: the author would have liked to give the book the title 'The Years That You Know', following the title of a book written in 1972 by Peter Rühmkorf, in which he combined his memories of the 1960s with all sorts of poems and fanciful reflections. But the title is protected by copyright, since the book was reprinted in 2000, and in any case it would

doubtless be somewhat impertinent to make such a takeover bid. This is why the present book is now drily entitled 'History of Germany in the Twentieth Century', which is after all a precise description of what is being attempted here. 'The Years That You Know', however, would have addressed the complex relationship of the Germans to their own twentieth century – a contemporary history which never fades away. It is true that when this book comes out the beginning of the Second World War will already lie 75 years in the past, but for anyone who follows newspapers and television programmes not a single day will go past without a mention of that war, the postwar years or the period of Nazi rule. The First World War began 100 years ago, and in this jubilee year the title pages of the weekly magazines have been full of it, and there will probably be more than a hundred new books published on the subject by the time the year ends. The events symbolised by the number '1968' are far from being regarded as entirely in the past; even now, every undesirable development in West German history is certain to be explained with a reference to them. Even people who know almost nothing, or at least very little of relevance, about these events have an opinion about them. Contemporary observers of the history of Germany in the twentieth century are therefore of a very special kind, almost independently of their age, and we need to take account of them, even if our intentions are largely critical. The purpose of the book is not to present suspiciously sensational novelties. The advantage of the historical view is rather that chronological separation and the use of a variety of perspectives allow new connections to be laid bare. It is also possible to reveal long-term processes and changes in conditions of life, political mentalities and cultural orientation the meaning of which was often entirely opaque to contemporaries.

The book is articulated in five sections, with the breaks between them placed in the years 1918, 1933, 1945, 1973 and 1990. The external structure conforms to these politically important dates, but the course of the argument as a rule does not. As in all the volumes in this series, chapters providing a cross-sectional view have been inserted into each section. In these chapters, individual years or time-intervals are examined more closely, independently of the course of political events. The years in question are 1900, 1926, 1942, 1965 and 1989-90.

Since work on the manuscript has taken much longer than planned, owing to a number of interruptions, the author has been forced into a constant chase after history, or, more precisely, the writing of history, because his own presentation had to be corrected, expanded, or given a different accentuation in view of the constant appearance of new studies of the period. Certainly, no-one who has written a work of contemporary history could possibly have coined the witty saying that Sisyphus must be imagined as a happy man! In some respects, indeed, work on later phases of the twentieth century has led the

presentation of earlier phases to undergo modification. The assertion that history is a construction has never appeared more persuasive to the author than on those occasions. And yet a return to the sources and to the statements by contemporaries that they contain has repeatedly brought him back to the view that the history presented here really did happen and that it is the historian's professional obligation to fulfil the responsibility that arises from this.

PART ONE: 1870 TO 1918

CHAPTER ONE: GERMANY AROUND 1900: PROGRESS AND ITS COSTS

In September 1913, on the occasion of the 25th. anniversary of Emperor William II's accession to the throne, a review of the economic development of Germany was presented by one of the leading German economists, Karl Helfferich, who was also a member of the board of management of the Deutsche Bank and the central executive committee of the Reichsbank. He wrote a book with the title 'Germany's National Wealth 1888-1913', in which he portrayed the rapid rise of the German economy: the growth of industry, the innovations in technology and science, the expansion of transport, communications and trade, the increase in income per head and the improvement of the standard of living of broad strata of the population. Helfferich concluded his sober description with a reference to the broader social and political context: 'In the development of scientific and practical technology, in the establishment of an economic organisation connecting together all forces and instruments in an effective manner, in the rise in the production and transportation of goods, in the growth and strengthening of our world economic position, in the improvement of people's income and financial circumstances and in the rise in the standard of living of our population while it proceeds to grow in a healthy fashion, in all these areas of progress Germany has raised itself up to a level never before reached in the whole of its previous history, and proved itself to be the equal of the first and most powerful of its rivals in the peaceful competition between the nations.' Germany's ascent, 'compressed into such a short space of time, hardly has its equal in the history of the nations.' It was therefore entirely legitimate to take pride in this immense achievement, Helfferich went on, especially as the Germans had been accustomed over previous decades 'to stand on the sidelines and humbly bow the knee in the face of other nations' superiority.' The effects of this attitude could still be felt today, he said, for the Germans were characterised on the one hand by a lack of healthy self-confidence, internal equilibrium and self-assurance, and on the other hand by attacks of 'vain presumption and su-

perfidious arrogance.' The successful and rapid ascent of Germany and in particular 'the big shifts in the internal structure of the population, namely changes in the relation between town and country, in professional and social structure and in financial circumstances' had led to 'a condition of tension' which was liable to threaten 'the foundations of the moral and physical health of large parts of the population'. It had led above all to 'class struggles and class hatred' but also to 'indolence, flabbiness, greed and a thirst for enjoyment.'¹

This accurately reflects the state of mind of the German elites and considerable sections of the German population in the years after the turn of the century. On the one hand there was a pride in what had been achieved which increased still more when the overwhelming economic expansion of the previous 25 years was compared with the data from other European countries, so that the rise of Germany to the position of one of the leading industrial nations of the world became apparent. On the other hand, there was also reason for lamentation. The new epoch was marred by the emergence of unwanted accompanying phenomena such as social contradictions, cultural tensions, and in politics as also in society a constant alternation between overweening pride and feelings of inferiority.

A Booming Economy

Helfferrich was looking back on a period which, if we look at it from our present standpoint, was a phase of historically unparalleled and almost unbroken expansion, lasting more than twenty years, by which Germany was transformed within a generation from an agrarian into an industrial state, thereby altering its structure and physiognomy to an extent never seen before in the whole of its history.

The phenomena of tremendous economic growth, rising industrial production and growing income per head were common to the whole of Europe in the last third of the nineteenth century. In fact the highest rates of increase in GNP between 1860 and 1910 were displayed by a number of smaller European states – Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. Among the larger states, however, Germany was always one of the countries with the highest rates of growth, whichever yardstick one chooses to apply, and in the two decades before and after 1900 it rose to become one of the three leading economies in the world. The others were the USA and Great Britain.

Not the least of the reasons for this astounding achievement was that in the previous years the leading industrial nations had enormously expanded the markets for their

products. Technical improvements in the transport of commodities by land and sea, the acceleration of communications brought about by the telegraph and the telephone, and the intensification of trading relations between the industrial countries and towards the colonised parts of the world had internationalised the process of economic exchange. It had become 'globalised', to use the word current since the 1980s, a decade when international links reached a yet higher level of intensity and frequency. The making of constant comparisons between the economic, technological, scientific and cultural achievements of the 'progressive' countries was also a feature of the situation around 1900. This was a way of expressing the 'peaceful competition' between nations. Evidence of denser forests or larger items of rolling stock was also viewed as a sign of the superiority of the nation in question.²

In Germany it was above all the speed of industrialisation which gave rise to astonishment. Industrial production rose six-fold between 1870 and 1913. In the 1860s Germany's share in world industrial production had amounted to a mere 4.9 percent, while Britain's share was almost 20 percent. In 1913, however, Germany's share was 14.8 percent. This was higher than Great Britain's share (13.6 percent) although considerably lower than that of the United States (32 percent), the other great economic growth story of those years. In the sphere of international trade, too, by the year 1910 Germany was one of the three leading nations, alongside Great Britain and the USA.³

In Germany the process of growth was marked by great unevenness. It varied by time, region and economic sector. Its chief feature, however, was the rapidity with which these far-reaching changes were accomplished. This is what gave the process described here the spectacular dynamism which had already impressed contemporaries and distinguished developments in Germany from simultaneous processes in other countries, where the transition from the industrial revolution to large-scale industrialisation often extended over a relatively long period. As late as 1867, more than half of the employed population of Germany, or rather the German Confederation, were involved in the agricultural sphere (8.3 million people, or 51.5 percent). Only 4.3 million people (27 percent) worked in industry, handicrafts and trade, and they were concentrated in a few places (the big cities, Silesia and the Rhineland.) By 1913 the total number of employees had increased considerably. This was true of agriculture as well, where 10.7 million people now worked, but agricultural employees now constituted only a third of all those in employment. The number of employees in the secondary sector, on the other hand, had almost tripled over the same period, and it now stood at 11.7 million, which corresponded to 37.8 percent of the total.⁴

These changes are still more striking when measured in monetary terms. In 1873 the value of all goods produced had stood at 16.3 billion Marks. Industry, handicrafts and mining accounted for a third of this sum. By 1900 the total value had doubled (33.1 billion Marks) and by 1913 it had tripled (48.4 billion Marks). In the meantime the share of industry, handicrafts and mining in the total had risen to 44 percent.

In face of such numbers, developments in the agricultural sphere give an impression rather of crisis, and contemporary observers were already warning of a decline in farming or even its complete collapse, although those who held this view were mainly agrarian lobbyists. Two tendencies were of decisive importance in this context: one was the expansion of agricultural production itself. This doubled in value between 1873 and 1913 and the number of people employed in the sector increased by more than a quarter. New techniques of production such as the use of artificial fertiliser, for instance, or the introduction of threshing machines, played an increasing role, although in Germany the mechanisation of agriculture proceeded more slowly than in the USA. Productivity and yields per hectare increased, and agricultural production rose by 73 percent between 1873 and 1912. Finally, in agriculture too, a focus on the market became the order of the day. Moreover, agriculture looked not just to the national but to the world market. This was made possible above all through the opening up of transport links such as railway lines, roads and canals.

In relation to the economy as a whole and the industrial sector in particular, however, the agricultural sector declined in importance, and within a short period it had lost its formerly dominant position in the German economy. The share of agriculture in the total value of production fell from 37 percent in 1875 to 23 percent in 1913, while its share of employment also fell, as we have seen, from more than a half to a third. Nevertheless, some 18 million people were still making their living from agriculture even after the turn of the century.⁵

The coal, iron and steel industries, the leading sectors of the first phase of industrialisation, continued to form the basis for rapid industrial growth. The amount of bituminous coal mined rose from 8 million tonnes in 1865 to 114 million tonnes in 1913, and the number of people employed in this sector rose from roughly 40,000 to almost half a million. Pig iron production had averaged 1.6 million tonnes a year between 1870 and 1874; thirty years later, between 1900 and 1904, it was 8 million tonnes, and just before the war it had risen to 14.8 million tonnes.⁶

But it was the new industries which were the most prominent hallmarks of the new century. The extraordinary dynamism and intensity of growth which characterised this period was seen most clearly in the chemical and electrical branches, the leading sectors in the second phase of industrialisation. Germany quickly became the world's leading producer of chemicals. Its chemical industry had a 28 percent share in the world export trade, 250,000 employees (1907) and annual rates of growth of over six percent. Here three developments stood out in particular: the growth of the electro-chemical industry, which made possible the production of aluminium; the manufacture of synthetic dyestuffs; and the rise of the pharmaceutical industry. German manufacturers were particularly successful in the last two of these branches, and they soon joined together in gigantic, vertically integrated chemical concerns. Between 1900 and the First World War Germany's share in the production of dyes for the world market fluctuated between 80 and 90 percent.

The electrification of public and private lighting, the use of electric motors and the spread of electrically driven trams and underground trains offered the electrical engineering industry tremendous opportunities for growth. Two large firms, Siemens and AEG, which had their main factories in Berlin, were the most active in this area. As in the case of chemicals, the close connection between science, technology and the electricity industry was of decisive significance: it meant that new discoveries, for instance in the area of high voltage technology, could be quickly put into practice in the industrial field. By 1910 all the big towns and cities and large parts of the countryside were already connected to the electrical grid. At this time German firms accounted for a third of world electrical engineering production. Growth rates were correspondingly high, standing at nine percent in 1890 and 16 percent in 1900.⁷

The Reinvention of the World

Alongside the explosive growth of industry this epoch was characterised above all by the systematic connection between science and technology. Its results changed the lives of contemporaries, and their perceptions, in ways previously thought impossible. Never before and never since has a scientific world-view changed so dramatically in such a short time and with such an impact as in the three decades before the First World War. In the field of chemistry centre stage was occupied by big advances in chemical synthesis,

such as the synthesis of indigo (1880), of rubber (1909), and of ammonia from nitrogen and hydrogen by the use of catalysts (1908). This facilitated the development of artificial materials, which now began their triumphant progress through industry and everyday life. At the same time the chemists succeeded in making the breakthrough into systematic pharmacology, thereby beginning the development of modern pharmaceutical chemistry. In physics the development of the theory of electromagnetism, the discovery of the electron and finally research into radiation were all of great significance. A particularly spectacular event was the discovery of x-rays by Conrad Röntgen, a phenomenon which could not be explained by means of the current physical theories. In this context, the quantum theory developed by Max Planck had already indicated the limitations of classical mechanics. Questions about the formation and the splitting of the atom now began to be raised. Hence the period around 1900 also saw the birth of nuclear physics. The theories of Charles Darwin had already gained acceptance in the field of biology; in the wake of this advance, causal explanations of the mysteries of life as being immanently present in nature itself drove out theological and metaphysical approaches. Cell research and the theory of evolution led into the new science of genetics. Biochemistry and behavioural research made their appearance, and they revolutionised traditional conceptions of life and human nature.⁸

But as far as the public were concerned the most sensational changes were in medicine, for after all it was the new potentialities for medical treatment which had the most direct impact on people's lives. The basis of this revolutionary development was the victory of scientific thought in the medical field: if illnesses originated in chemical and physical changes, it must be possible to prove the connection with the methods of natural science. This was the starting-point for the differentiation of medicine into individual specialisms, and the creation of a systematic science of medicine soon resulted in outstanding successes. Thus in the field of physiology and cell research the classification of hormones, vitamins and blood groups could now be undertaken. The discovery of microorganisms allowed the pathogens that caused many illnesses to be identified and successfully fought with the help of antibodies. In the 1870s and 1880s, with the discovery of the agents responsible for anthrax, tuberculosis and cholera, a triumphant onslaught began on diseases which affected large numbers of people. This was followed by campaigns against gonorrhoea, typhus, diphtheria, pneumonia and syphilis. And finally the improvement of techniques of anaesthesia made it possible to carry out operations unthinkable until then: gall bladders, kidneys and appendixes could now be removed surgically.

The tremendous growth of the natural sciences was a phenomenon common to all industrial countries. Scientists in Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy and the USA had

close links with each other, and the successes of scientific and medical research at that time, which contemporaries found almost inconceivable, owed a tremendous amount to this international co-operation. Despite this, these successes were also often interpreted in nationalistic terms. It was claimed that they demonstrated the excellence not just of the scientists responsible but also of the nations to which they belonged. This applied particularly to Germany, and the development of natural and medical science did in fact proceed there with well-nigh dramatic intensity. Almost half the significant scientific discoveries in the medical field between 1860 and 1910 (249 out of 556) have been ascribed to German specialists. In physics too, the German contribution was roughly as large as it was in medicine, and this was soon reflected in the number of Nobel prizes awarded, for the Nobel Prize was also an expression and an instrument of the competition between the industrial nations for prestige, influence and market share.⁹

These astounding German successes in the scientific field were mainly grounded in the system of school and university education, which had been extended systematically since the middle of the century with the aim of counteracting the economic backwardness of the German states, especially in comparison with Great Britain. The foundation of the German Empire led to an intensification of these efforts, which were pursued even more strongly after the turn of the century. Between 1873 and 1914 expenditure on the universities by the federal states that made up Germany rose by almost 500 percent. The number of high-school students doubled over this period, while the number of university students registered a fivefold increase.

The basic principle adopted by the German universities was the primacy of research. Scientists' careers were determined by their research achievements, and research into fundamentals occupied pride of place. Technological applications, it turned out, could not really be planned. They emerged rather as side-effects of pure research which was pursued without any practical objective. This line of approach was the basis of the leading position of the German university system in the world, and it was copied by the founders of universities both in the USA and in Russia. In the 1880s, moreover, the existing universities were supplemented by Technical Universities, which served to train the very large number of technical experts now required in branches of the economy such as mining, and mechanical, electrical, and civil engineering. This increase in the number of scientifically-educated specialists had a particular impact on the new leading sectors of chemicals and electrical engineering, and it formed the basis for an intensification of product-oriented industrial research. The third pillar of this educational edifice was the research institute. The first big research establishments were founded around the turn of the century. They were examples of close co-operation between science, industry and the state. They received immense sums of money, were constructed as special estab-

ishments devoted to particularly promising research fields, and they were often given the title 'Emperor William Institutes'.¹⁰

The successes of scientific research were reflected above all in the technological innovations which transformed everyday life profoundly and to some extent disconcertingly. This applied particularly to the rapid spread of electrical lighting, which had become cheap and relatively safe to utilise since the introduction of the tungsten filament lamp. Hardly anything changed the perception of life in the cities as much as the nocturnal illumination of streets, squares and houses. Side by side with this there was the increasing ubiquity of the electric motor, which was an essential element in household electrical appliances and also of the electrically-powered trams which now began their rapid spread over Germany's cities. By 1900 there were already roughly 3,000 kilometres of tramlines in Germany. This was as much as in all other European countries put together, a statistic which was immediately calculated and triumphantly made public. The internal combustion engine was also developed at this time, thereby beginning the success story of the automobile, although not in fact in Germany. It is true that functionally adequate prototypes were first developed there, by Benz, Otto and Daimler, but Germany did not possess an adequate market for this invention. Until the early 1950s motoring remained the privilege of the property-owning upper strata of the country. In the USA, in contrast, more than 1.2 million motor vehicles were already in use by 1913, and in Great Britain 250,000, as against a mere 70,000 in Germany.

At the turn of the century, the symbol of travel by the individual was rather the bicycle, which now experienced a real boom, and rose to become a means of mass transport, as well as dominating the first modern phase of mass sporting activity. Office and communication technology experienced similarly rapid advances at this time: the typewriter and the telephone came into use first in private firms, then in the state bureaucracy and private households. By 1895 there were already 100,000 telephone lines in Germany, in 1904 there were more than half a million, the greater part of them in Berlin, and by 1915 there were 220 telephone lines for every 1,000 inhabitants. The entertainment industry, finally, was also revolutionised. Improvements in photographic technique allowed the first moving pictures to be produced, and from being displayed in annual fairs they moved to fixed locations, or 'moving picture theatres'. These soon exerted their spell on a mass public. By 1914 there were already roughly 2,500 cinemas in Germany.¹¹

The Dynamic of Social Change

The economic, scientific and technological changes we have mentioned were accompanied by a rapid process of social change. At the turn of the century the German population was experiencing a previously unheard-of degree of geographical mobility. In 1907 only half of all Germans still lived where they were born. The rest had changed their place of residence at least once, the working population much more frequently. The initial starting-point of this trend was the tremendous increase in population which had already been apparent since the middle of the century and had accelerated since the 1870s. Between 1871 and 1910 the number of Germans grew from 41 to 64 million. This was an increase of more than a half (56 percent). It was somewhat higher than the European average of approximately 45 percent. The population of France, on the other hand, only increased by 6 percent during this period, a phenomenon interpreted in that country as a sign of weakness and degeneration.

Until the early 1890s, the large increase in Germany's population was caused first and foremost by a reduction in infant mortality. After that date the main causal factor was an accelerated decline in the overall death rate, resulting from improved living conditions and better medical care. In the first phase of industrialisation, starting in the mid-nineteenth century, the increase in population led to a worsening of living conditions, because no corresponding employment opportunities were available, particularly in the countryside. The reaction of the people to this dilemma was a great wave of emigration. Between 1880 and 1895 almost two million Germans left the country. Most of them headed for North America. After 1895, however, the rapid economic development of the German Empire began to create a considerable need for labour, above all in the newly emerging industrial agglomerations of Berlin, Silesia, Saxony and the Ruhr. Now the stream of emigrants changed direction, strengthening migratory movements within the country which had already been apparent since the 1870s. Internal migration generally proceeded from East to West, from country to town, and from agricultural to industrial regions. This movement was driven by poverty and under-employment in the countryside, and people were enticed into industrial employment by better wages, greater security of employment and the greater measure of individual freedom in the towns, which was often stated to be the primary motive for moving.

The majority of the migrants were young, unmarried men. Many of them were recruited by the big firms, the mining companies above all, which promised them work and a place to live in the industrial areas. On arrival, most of them did not settle down immediately but frequently changed where they lived and worked. It has been calculated that every German who lived in an urban area moved four times a year. Many also returned to the

countryside at times of economic depression, coming back to town when work again became available.¹²

The gigantic migratory movements of the time were also the most important trigger for urbanisation. 'Urbanisation' refers, firstly, to the growth in the urban population, which had already been apparent since the 1860s but accelerated from the 1890s onwards. Towns dominated by mining and heavy industry experienced particularly rapid growth. The number of inhabitants of Duisburg increased between 1875 and 1910 from 37,000 to 229,000. The increase in Essen was from 54,000 to 294,000, and in Leipzig the population grew from 127,000 to 589,000. The biggest increase – in numerical terms – was in Berlin. Here the number of inhabitants grew from 966,000 to over two million. In percentage terms the increase was more rapid in neighbouring suburbs such as Schöneberg and Charlottenburg which were soon to be incorporated into the city. Charlottenburg's population jumped from 25,000 to 305,000 over this period. In 1871 there were only eight cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in Germany. A total of just two million people lived in them. In 1920 there were 48 cities in this category, with a total of roughly 13 million inhabitants, a fifth of the country's population. Of course, roughly half the population still lived in rural communities or small towns in 1910. Thus the picture of the German Empire continued to be dominated by the rural and small-town milieu, but its predominance was no longer overwhelming.. Now the big industrial towns were equally important.¹³

The word 'urbanisation' also refers to the victorious advance of the new big-city way of life, which differed radically from the traditionalism of the small towns and villages. The big city became the symbol of the epoch. The profile of German society was reforged in the big cities. The face of urban society no longer bore the imprint of groups like the nobility, the clergy and the 'burgher estate' (*Bürgerstand*), legitimated by the Estates tradition of the past, but consisted of classes, which were defined by their position in the market society of capitalism. The social hierarchy in the towns of the turn of the century was also determined to a large extent by the class system, defined in the latter way.

The topmost social stratum was made up of the small group of the wealthy big bourgeoisie, consisting of not more than one to two hundred thousand persons. Beneath this narrow crust were the economic bourgeoisie proper, consisting of entrepreneurs in industry, trade and handicrafts. They made up roughly three to four percent of the population. Below them were the educated bourgeoisie (*Bildungsbürgertum*), a group which comprised only about one percent of the population at the turn of the century. This group was on the increase, through the entry of members of the academic profession into state ser-

vice: they joined the bureaucracy, the legal and medical systems and the educational institutions. At the same time there was also a considerable increase in the number of people with an academic education employed in the industrial sphere, such as engineers, chemists and architects. The *Mittelstand*, the so-called 'lower middle class', was much less homogeneous. It comprised not just the 'old' *Mittelstand* – such as small traders, artisans, middle-ranking officials and officers in the armed forces – but also the rapidly growing army of salaried employees in the industrial and service sectors, the 'new' *Mittelstand*. All these groups, taken together, made up the 'bourgeoisie' (*Bürgertum*). They constituted roughly eight to ten percent of the population, barely five million people.

The social differences between these various groups of 'bourgeois' were nevertheless immense, as was the symbolic distance that separated them. One of the new super-rich large-scale entrepreneurs such as Krupp, Thyssen or von Stumm-Halberg was worlds away from a master-craftsman, a town official or a schoolmaster. Not just materially, but in social behaviour, stretching all the way from their attitude to marriage to their mode of social intercourse. And yet there was a bond that encompassed and joined together all these groups, namely their common relation to bourgeois culture, and the high value they placed on humanistic education and the norms of bourgeois morality. This is what allows us to refer to them in their totality as 'the bourgeoisie.'¹⁴

The second class defined by the market, the working class, was also an extremely heterogeneous entity. If one takes the narrower group, which consisted of dependent workers employed in industry, trade and transport, one arrives at 24 percent of the population in 1882 and roughly 33 percent in 1907. If one also includes agricultural workers, domestic workers and servants, hence the lower strata of pre-industrial times, the proportion rises to 50 percent. On the other hand, if one takes the Prussian income statistics and counts all who were below the poverty line of an income of 900 Marks a year, this amounts to almost two thirds of the whole society. The same order of magnitude is also reached when the share of wage-labourers in the total number of economically active people is measured. This rose from 56 percent in 1875 to 76 percent in 1907.

Even if the narrowest definition is taken as a basis, the group that results is itself not socially homogeneous. Individual groups of workers differed far too widely from one another for this. Regional origin is one distinguishing mark. The original inhabitants had been moulded by very different previous experiences and their attitudes were very different from those of the incomers from the East. Another distinguishing mark was social origin. Most of the workers were the children of members of the lowest strata. But more and more children of artisans, peasants or small-scale independent producers and trad-

ers were entering the working class. The 'proletarianisation' of the lower *Mittelstand* was a widespread phenomenon, and a subject of anxious discussion. Different levels of training also created big distinctions between individual groups of workers. What it meant to be a 'skilled worker' could not be defined exactly, but a trained metal-worker's conditions of employment, for instance, were much better than those of a semi-skilled 'labourer', who was the first to be laid off in a conjunctural downturn, and when the next opportunity came up was again given merely short-term employment.

Differences between workers in large and small enterprises were also considerable. But the biggest difference of all was between males and females and young and old workers. Young male workers were best paid and had the best social position, while poverty remained the widespread fate of workers in old age. In 1907 between 15 and 20 percent of employed workers were female, though the proportion naturally varied greatly between different industrial sectors. The women were mostly unskilled or semi-skilled and earned distinctly less than men doing the same job.

But these considerable variations and differences were outweighed by a number of common features: the hours of work were long, the work was as a rule physically exhausting, dirty and dangerous, living arrangements in the cramped dwellings of the big cities were oppressive. Loss of employment signified impoverishment for the whole family. Despite the system of social insurance that was gradually being introduced, for the workers an inability to work because of accident or sickness remained right into the twentieth century a risk as terrifying as it was real and life-threatening.

The increasing prevalence of wage-labour also contributed to the unification of the working class. Partial payment in kind continued to exist in the countryside for a long time, but in the towns it rapidly lost all significance. In the long run, the situation of the workers as regards income began to improve: the average nominal annual wage rose from 506 Marks (1870) to 711 Marks (1890) and then to 1,163 Marks (1913), though here too there were big differences between the individual branches of industry. Real wages also rose. They increased by 50 percent between 1871 and 1890, and by 1913 they had risen by 90 percent. These were considerable increases, but wages in Germany still remained significantly below those enjoyed by workers in France, Great Britain and the USA.

As a result of this rise in income the worst distress of the working population was on the whole alleviated, and still further improvement seemed likely in the longer term. In 1892

in Prussia and in 1895 in Saxony three quarters of the taxpaying citizens had been assessed below the taxable limits of 900 and 950 Marks of annual income, respectively, and they were therefore living in poverty. But by 1912 this proportion had fallen to a half.¹⁵ Even so, that meant that at least every second person continued to live in poverty.

The gap between rich and poor widened considerably in the years of rapid industrialisation. In 1854 in Prussia a fifth of the total income went to the wealthiest five percent of the population; by 1873 this figure had increased to a quarter, and in 1913 it was a third. In contrast to this the share of the poorest 25 percent of the population fell from 8 percent to 7 percent over the same period of time. These figures were by no means unusual in the international context: in Great Britain five percent of the people, the top earners, received almost half the total income. But in Germany it was the rapid increase in income differences and in the share of income received by the top earners which drew attention.¹⁶ One of the greatest concerns of the time in Germany was the apparently inexorable widening of the gap between rich and poor and the concomitant growth in social divisions. Conservatives and socialists were at one in criticising the 'social dismemberment of the nation' by modern capitalism, although their objectives were completely different.

Well into the first half of the twentieth century the social structures prevailing in rural areas continued to be very different from those that had taken shape in the towns. Even taking into account regional divergences, a three-way division between big landowners, peasant farmers and agricultural workers predominated in the countryside. Big landownership, which was particularly widespread in the economically backward districts of the north-east of the country, had its origin in part in the manorial estates (*Rittergüter*) held by the nobility. The legal and social privileges traditionally attached to these estates had it is true gradually been removed since the Prussian reform era, but not completely. In many respects they lasted into the twentieth century despite the movement towards civil equality. These survivals affected the tax system, the legal system, the institutions of rural self-government and also the position of day-labourers, housemaids and servants. Rural Germany, above all Germany east of the River Elbe, remained the domain of manorial rule. This was not identical with the rule of the nobility, however. As early as the 1860s a majority of the manorial estates were in bourgeois hands, and by 1880 the proportion had risen to two thirds.

Many estates had sunk deeper and deeper into debt since the 1870s, partly owing to the difficult crisis of adaptation facing agriculture, but also because of mismanagement and excessive consumption of luxuries by the estate-owning nobility. This led to their sale,

often to wealthy bourgeois. In order to avoid economic ruin, many estate-owners now began to adapt themselves more vigorously to modern capitalist economic principles, turning themselves into agricultural entrepreneurs; this was of course a very long process. At the same time, however, the new bourgeois estate-owners adopted or imitated the style of life of the 'Junkers' and took over some of their privileges. Many of them strove to obtain titles. This was a trend seen in many Western European states at that time, but the German nobility reacted by hardening the barriers that separated them from the newly rich social climbers. In Germany, therefore, the number of newly ennobled families remained relatively small.

Although the economic weight of agriculture had declined, the nobles retained their special social position. As landowners, the nobility continued to dominate the countryside, often in connection with their role as District Administrators (*Landräte*), in other words members of the regional state bureaucracy which was continuously increasing its influence. Above all, though, the nobles were highly over-represented at the top of the administration, in the diplomatic service and in the army leadership. Almost all the army generals were members of the nobility. At the beginning of the new century, the social prestige and political influence of the nobility were paradoxically higher than they had been at the beginning of the age of industrialisation.¹⁷

Around the turn of the century there were altogether 5.5 million owners of land in Germany, or more than 10 million if their families are included. Less than 0.5 percent counted as big landowners; all the others were peasant farmers. There were only approximately 250,000 well-off peasant proprietors, each holding 20 to 100 hectares of land, while the number of middle-ranking peasants, with up to 20 hectares of land each, was estimated at roughly a million. These two groups dominated the social hierarchy of the village and were sharply distinct from the more than four million small and dwarf ('parcel-holding') peasants, who were unable to live from the yield of their land or could only eke out a miserable existence from it. For most of this group farming was a subsidiary occupation and they earned their money as day-labourers on the lands of the nobility and the richer peasants, or they already worked in a nearby town.¹⁸

The agricultural workers, finally, stood below the rural proprietors and their families. There were roughly six million of them, if we include their families, and they lived in needy, indeed in poverty-stricken, circumstances. At the beginning of the new century some of them continued to be dependent on the owners of the manorial estates, although this 'semi-free' status as tenants (*Inste*), crofters (*Kätner*) or cottagers (*Häusler*) was becoming increasingly rare even in the back-country of East Elbia. Most of them

were day-labourers, hence formally free wage-labourers, although here the principle of market-based wage-labour was only gradually making inroads. There were also servants, in other words men and women who were employed on the manors and farms as a permanent labour-force rather than as day-labourers. The rural proletariat and the parcel-holding peasants increasingly regarded their dependence on peasant farmers or estate-owners as oppressive. It was this, as well as bad living and working conditions, which made migrating to the towns and securing a job in industry a tempting prospect.

Town and country gradually started to be mutually interlocking. The most important factors in this process were market relations, the state administration, railways, taxes, military service and compulsory education. Even so, right into the twentieth century the village remained a world of its own, marked by sharp-edged and almost insurmountable social hierarchies, where there was little chance of rising in the social scale, greater social control was exerted and the culture was imbued with traditional norms.¹⁹

If we look at the social structure of Wilhelmine Germany as a whole, we see a divided society. On the one hand there was a rapidly expanding class society of a capitalist kind – urban and industrial, and marked by tremendous growth and a high degree of transformation in all areas of life. On the other hand we see an agrarian society, also influenced, and increasingly so, by the dynamism of industry, but still clearly characterised by an inherited Estates structure and the survival of traditional norms, which also moulded how new developments were perceived. Both situations existed simultaneously and were superimposed on each other: the sharp class antagonisms and social inequality typical of industrial societies stood alongside the estate-based divisions and highly marked privileges enjoyed by the nobility, the military, the bureaucracy and the big land-owners.

If a comparison is made with the rest of Europe, these features were not specific to Germany. In this long phase of transition from a society under predominantly agrarian determination to a predominantly industrial society, the simultaneous existence of traditional and modern formations is rather the rule than the exception. The fashionable dominance of an aristocratic style of life in the upper strata of bourgeois society, the continuing impact of rural norms and traditions, the stubborn independence of rural modes of life, are all found in other industrialising countries of Europe at this time, as well as in the southern United States.

One's eyes therefore return again and again to what is the most outstanding peculiarity of Germany's development: the immense rapidity of the economic, social and cultural transformations of the decades around the turn of the century. Areas of friction between traditional and modern attitudes were greater here, there were more potential conflicts and the changes were experienced more intensely.²⁰

Enthusiasm for Progress and a Crisis of Direction

The modern metropolis was the symbol of this dynamic of forced transformation, and the modern metropolis was represented by Berlin. 'It is a new city, the newest I have ever seen' wrote Mark Twain, who came from America to visit Germany in 1892. 'Chicago would seem venerable beside it, for there are many old-looking districts in Chicago, but not many in Berlin. The main mass of the city looks as if it had been built last week.'²¹ Contemporaries were very impressed by the building mania that took hold of Berlin around the turn of the century. Whole new districts of the city sprang up within a few years, transport links were doubled and redoubled, life was conducted at a breathless pace. Visitors reacted with confusion; this was felt even more strongly by those who had been drawn into the city from the countryside. 'What an idea of Berlin we got!' wrote the agricultural worker Franz Rehbein on his first journey by train from Pomerania into the capital city of the German Empire. 'We had been told wondrous things about the city, about its size, its houses reaching up into the sky and its fairytale lighting. The number of station lights now increased rapidly. We took turns to stick our heads out of the carriage windows and look in the direction of the sea of lights in the capital. Exclamations of surprise and astonishment followed: There were probably not as many lights in the whole of Hither Pomerania as we could see shining towards us on our journey into the city.'²² The baker's apprentice Jessaia Gronach had a similar experience when he travelled from Galicia to Berlin for the first time in 1906: 'I wasn't coming into a city. A city was coming into me. Here I felt invaded, attacked, pulled in all directions by a new rhythm, new people, a new language, new manners and customs. I had to keep hold of myself, open my eyes wide, and tense my muscles, in order not to be overrun, crushed, squashed.'²³

During these decades Berlin embodied the breakthrough into the modern epoch in a way matched only by London and New York. The ceaseless building activity, the construction of new shopping palaces which were ever larger and more magnificent, the spread of modern means of transport and communication, all these things symbolised the far-reaching optimism of everyday life. It was firmly believed that the discovery of nature's secrets and the mastery of technology would lead to unlimited progress. Werner von Siemens, one of the most famous inventors and entrepreneurs of his epoch, summed up this happy certainty about the future in these words: 'Our activities in research and in-

vention lead people to a higher cultural level, ennoble them and make them more accessible to the search for ideals ... and the dawning age of natural science will satisfy their needs, lessen their infirmities, increase their enjoyment of life, and make them better, happier and more contented with their fate.²⁴ And just as at night towns could be made as light as day and traversed within minutes in electrical trains running through tunnels kilometres in length, just as hitherto incurable illnesses could be overcome and products made out of artificial materials, so also the laws of collective social life would soon be discovered, allowing a reshaping of the foundations of state and society, based on the principles of rationality, predictability and technological reasoning. That was the widespread conviction.

But the marvels of technology and organisation were only one aspect of the way the new epoch was perceived. For at the same time the new cities, and Berlin particularly, stood for the social distress of the industrial workers, their wretched housing conditions, and the growing antagonism between rich and poor. The 'social question' was in the forefront of public debate in the German Empire at the turn of the century, and it was taken up as an issue by the workers and the working-class movement, which was pushing for improvements in social conditions, but it was of equally central importance to the bourgeoisie and the nobility, who viewed demands for social improvement as a threat not just to their privileges but to the state and the community in general. The bourgeoisie saw the tearing asunder of society and the struggle between the social classes that accompanied it as the most evident drawback of the modern epoch, and it was not long before people began to consider how tendencies towards class division could be combated by emphasising the importance of the national community.

The new urban agglomerations destroyed the landscape, concentrated hundreds of thousands of people in a confined space, and produced piles of rubbish and noxious odours. People's lives and perceptions also underwent changes. Speed, organisation, planning, an increased division of labour and an altered perception of time and space gave rise to new requirements which were often seen as excessive. 'Audiences last five minutes, telephone conversations last one minute, the rotary printer acts in one second and the movements of the bicycle wheel are measured in fifths of a second' : these are the new units of time by which human life is now determined, wrote the cultural historian Karl Lamprecht in 1912. To suffer from excessive stimulation of the senses – 'nerves', 'neurasthenia' – became the fashionable sickness of the age. 'The haste, restlessness and discomfort of social existence, class and racial hatred, and the drive to change economic and social conditions at any price' were the reasons for this sickness, as was confirmed by the representatives of the appropriate new scientific disciplines – neurologists, psychologists and psychiatrists.²⁵

It was not just the environment that was changing, but the people themselves. New forms of behaviour were necessary if one wanted to make one's mark in the factory, the town, the tenement house or the street. Sex roles began to change, as did the relation between the generations. New leisure activities arose, which influenced the way the world was experienced and the taste of the masses. But there was as yet no sign of any new guidelines corresponding to the changed conditions, and this made the search for them all the more intense.

At the turn of the century, the sense of loss and anxiety grew into a manifest crisis of direction, which became one of the characteristics of the epoch. The new industrial world was exposed to ever sharper criticism. This was voiced most eloquently and most vociferously by members of the bourgeoisie, above all the educated bourgeoisie. It is one of the paradoxes of the period that in a phase during which the capitalist economy and modern science, which were the most outstanding fields of activity of the bourgeoisie, flourished as never before, that same bourgeoisie began to suffer from grave doubts, distancing itself ever more emphatically from the cultural changes brought about by its own success. It was among the bourgeoisie that opposition to materialism and the power of money, to 'cold' intellectualism, to the division of labour and specialisation, to alienation and 'massification', was most widespread, and this opposition developed into a movement of protest against the cultural concomitants of modernity as a whole.²⁶

Criticism of this kind were not necessarily associated with a rejection of technology, industry and science as such. It was by no means regarded as certain that the emergence of the capitalist form of economic organisation inescapably involved specific changes in the spheres of culture and society, from the division of the community into classes to the creation of 'mass society' and the enticements offered by the big city. To that extent we can also understand these manifold critiques of modernity as an endeavour to accept aspects of the new epoch that were regarded as positive but to steer clear of accompanying phenomena that were felt to be harmful.²⁷

The critique of modernity also reflected the declining significance of the authority which had traditionally provided direction and meaning to life, namely religious belief. It is true that religious affiliation and church-based ties continued to be the most important cultural factors in Germany. It was regarded as self-evident that a person had to belong to one of the two confessions, and religious ties were in fact strengthened by the confessional divide and the resultant rivalry between Protestants and Catholics. But at the same time

the hold of the churches on everyday life was gradually becoming looser and religious norms were losing their compulsory character. This process was clear to see, particularly in the towns, and it increased the need to make sense of the world, and to establish a new order and a new security.²⁸

The reconstruction of the world through technology, science and capital in those years doubtless went hand in hand with growing insecurity, a loss of confidence, a loosening of ties, even private ones, economic insecurity and social instability, but it also meant greater opportunities for many people, with a chance of rising in the social scale for some and even for the working-class population the prospect of a considerable long-term improvement in their situation, in view of the prosperity of the industrial economy. The atmosphere at the turn of the century was therefore marked by both states of mind: optimism about progress and pessimism about the future. There was both relief at being freed from the old conventions and anxiety about the way new elements were intruding into the accustomed environment.

The commonest and most widespread reaction to these challenges was to keep a firm grip on traditional and inherited values. This attitude was most pronounced in the private spheres of family and sexuality, child-rearing and modes of living. The nineteenth century had witnessed the victory of the bourgeois model of the family. This had three main characteristics: the unconditional rule of the husband over wife and children, a gender-based division of roles, whereby the husband was active in professional and public life while the wife was responsible for running the house and bringing up the children, and finally the ideal unity of marriage, love and sexuality. After the end of the century, however, the basic assumptions of private life began to change. Among the lower social strata, above all the new groups of urban industrial workers, who often had little to tie them down, ambiguous marital and familial relationships were frequent, as were illegitimate children and single mothers. The growing use of the expression 'young people' referred to an age-group standing halfway between childhood and adulthood. This was felt to be a new phenomenon, with its own way of life and a new sense of self, and it was often anxiously rejected. Moreover, many women, particularly among the bourgeoisie, had the urge to overturn traditional role-models and break free from the limitations of family life and child-rearing. This aspiration frequently came up against aggressive male resistance. Prostitution and homosexuality, phenomena which surfaced more visibly and on a larger scale in the big cities than in the discreet niches they had occupied in provincial towns, were regarded as a symptom of the way modernity was undermining moral values and an assault on the family, marriage and normality. The big city was referred to as 'the great whore of Babylon'.²⁹

A powerful counter-movement therefore emerged, which found expression both in public declarations, articles and social commentaries, and in legislation. Both the Reich Criminal Code (*Reichsstrafgesetzbuch*) of 1871 and the Civil Code (*Bürgerlicher Gesetzbuch*) of 1900, which unified and reorganised the different laws of the German federal states, were used to ward off these threats, and give written expression to the traditional ideals of family and morality. In the treatment of homosexuality, therefore, the greater severity of the Prussian legislation was adopted rather than the more liberal traditions of the South German states. Indeed, in some respects the Prussian provisions were themselves made increasingly draconian. The aim of the divorce laws was to protect the institution of marriage even against the personal wishes of married couples, and they accordingly imposed further restrictions on the grounds for divorce. The legal position of the husband in relation to his wife was made stronger. He was entrusted with a kind of guardianship over his partner. A wife's ability to conduct business was already limited, yet here too the Civil Code worsened the position. The illegitimate child and its mother were subjected to considerable legal discrimination. The prohibition of abortion continued to be backed up by legal penalties, and the ambit of the law was extended still further.³⁰

Repressive lawmaking of this kind should be understood above all as a reaction to changes in traditional structures and a weakening of their hold, or the fear that this would happen. In the fight against the feared destruction of the family, marriage and the moral law by the big city, the industrial proletariat and mass society, as well as by the endeavours of women and young people to gain their independence, traditional norms and the notions of right and wrong handed down with them were to be fixed from top to bottom and firmly secured against all possible alterations. There were two reasons for this reaction: firstly, it was in the political interest of those groups which were in general against any change in society and sought to formalise existing power relations by establishing stable normative structures. Secondly, the shoring up of traditional values at a time of extreme social and cultural change also corresponded to the needs of all those people who needed a definite list of norms so as to be able to deal with the new experiences that were pouring in. The latter group certainly comprised the majority of society, irrespective of political divisions.

But there were also forces working in the opposite direction, which attempted to reform the sphere of private life and adapt to the new reality. Deviations regarded as criminal were now at least a subject of public debate, in politics and scientific discourse. They were no longer merely pushed aside and suppressed. Repressive methods of education

and the suffering caused by the rigid enforcement of norms of sexuality became big literary themes. Nakedness and sexuality were now frequently presented in a positive way, as elements of a direct and natural life. A movement for sexual reform also arose. This called for changes in legal norms, as applied to family law, the treatment of homosexuality, or the approach to illegitimacy. The first steps towards a loosening of moral codes were perceptible: For example, the famous bathing-machines, which women who visited a spa were forced to use to avoid the eyes of the curious when they took the waters, now disappeared gradually. Clothes were less strictly regulated, and relations between the sexes began to be more relaxed, although this only happened in the big cities and even then only in restricted social circles.

The connection between enthusiasm for progress and the search for security by holding onto traditional values was also apparent in other spheres of activity: in architecture for example. The showpiece buildings of the new Berlin were constructed in the peculiar style known as Historicism. Neo-Renaissance, Neo-Baroque, and Neo-Romanesque dominated the skyline: there were towers, domes, statues, castle-like constructions, ornamentation and inscriptions which were allegedly historical but served completely mundane purposes. An inclination towards ostentation, magnificence and monumentalism was very evident. Railway stations resembled cathedrals, town halls resembled Hohenstaufen fortresses, department stores resembled castles out of a fantasy past, but the main rule was that everything should have a definite 'old German' look about it. This was a young society, in a newly founded nation-state, a state which had never existed before in that form. Yet the more insecure people felt about the future the more vehemently did they swear by tradition. It was above all buildings with especially 'modern' purposes, such as banks, insurance buildings and railway stations, which were given pseudo-historical accoutrements. The 'Aschinger' in Berlin was a cheap restaurant where more than 4,000 people could eat at the same time. When it was rebuilt, this historical masquerade reached new heights. As a French journalist noted in astonishment, 'The façade was in the style of a medieval cathedral, the walls were heathen burial-chambers, the basements, taken from the Thousand and One Nights, were veritable Indian cave-dwellings, and the halls could have accommodated the kings of the Goths.'³¹

This architectural combination of technological modernity and monumental, pseudo-historical drapery demonstrated how proud people were of what had been achieved, and how uncertain they were of how to deal with it. This was symbolised in a curious way in the behaviour of the German Emperor, William II, who represented the country during this period of dramatic transformation. William's enthusiasm for modern technology was

legendary, as was his condemnation of the phenomena that accompanied the new epoch, from parliamentarism to modern art. His orientation towards an idealised past was expressed just as much in his preference for a romanticised Middle Ages as in his richly ornamented and constantly changing uniforms. The bombastic style of the monarch, his inclination towards the grand and impressive gesture, showed that he was a parvenu, who was uncertain about how to handle his new wealth. The more dynamic the transformations of the present, the more he sought out artificial symbols of his roots in the past and in tradition. In this sense, William personified the emblematic, 'modern' type of contemporary German: the social climber and careerist who thirsted for respectability and prestige and yet remained one of the new rich without roots in the soil or a calm feeling of self-confidence, a lack for which he compensated with a snappy military bearing and a typically Prussian abruptness exaggerated *ad nauseam*, combined with arrogance, the mentality of a subaltern and a bellowing chauvinism. That is of course a caricature, but William was often perceived in this way, above all when his diplomatic mishaps and embarrassments started to happen more frequently. The period was admittedly marked by other characteristic figures: the witty, ironic *litterateur*, the working-class leader who was both respectable and revolutionary, the enthusiast for the youth movement, or the gnarled business patriarch. But William expressed much of the spirit of the epoch through his restlessness, his typical combination of arrogance and feelings of inferiority, and his strident emotionalism.³²

The conduct of the monarch also corresponded with the requirements of German society, which expressed its pride in the rapid rise of the country in pageantry and grand gestures, while it sought after security and authority in compensation for the loss of many traditions which had provided a firm foothold. Needs of this kind bound the bourgeoisie to the state and its representatives. Since the defeat of the revolution of 1848-49 the strength of state institutions and the weakness of parliamentarism had been fundamental structural features first of Prussian, and then of Prusso-German society. Then, when the German nation-state had been founded from above, a feat which was made possible by three deliberately planned and victorious wars, this basic authoritarian structure was supplemented by the primacy of the military, which continued to operate even decades after the victories of the 1860s and beyond. In no other industrial state of the period did members of the military caste attain such a level of social prestige. From then on, the manners of the military practically set the trend, in the field of education as much as in social intercourse. The dominance of the military, like the existence of an authoritarian state, offered a reliable element of stabilisation, and in a world which was literally breaking loose from its moorings it promised security, constancy and reliability.³³

The search for familiar landmarks for purposes of orientation was one of the dominant features of the epoch. The workers' movement offers a further example of this. It came into existence as a defensive association of the new urban wage-labourers with the following aims: to represent the workers' social and political interests vis-à-vis the entrepreneurs and the state, to obtain a certain basic security of existence through improved wages and the beginnings of social insurance and to obtain political representation in the parliaments in order to look after the interests of the workers, who were at first very under-represented there. At the same time the socialist workers' movement, in Germany as elsewhere, shared the enthusiasm felt over the economic, technological, scientific and cultural progress of the epoch. The socialists were convinced, after all, that if only greater political and social justice could be achieved, economic progress would eventually also benefit the broad masses of workers. The social democratic workers of Germany were convinced that the future belonged to them.³⁴

As far as the present was concerned, however, the organisations of the workers' movement were above all places of refuge, which offered security and companionship in a new and unfathomable world. The first trip made by the already-mentioned apprentice baker Jessaia Gronach, who felt completely crushed after his arrival in Berlin, led him to the trade union headquarters, located on the Berlin Engelufer. Here he had a friendly reception. The bakers' trade union offered him assistance and a feeling of intimacy: 'I received information, a waiting number for my certificate, financial support, advice about a place to sleep, and food ... Yes, I was scared! Berlin! I had a healthy respect for this giant of a city, but Engelufer 12 was friendly, called me colleague and comrade, and offered me its hand. My heart began to fill with self-confidence.'³⁵

This way of integrating workers into familiar social and cultural surroundings, into the 'social and moral milieu', became very important in the decades after 1900. The most significant example of this is the close bond the socialist workers' movement offered, with its many clubs and organisations for dealing with the problems of life and taking care of the worker's day-to-day needs. The effects of this bond went far beyond the movement's political objectives. Similar developments took place in the case of Roman Catholic workers. They benefited from the social and cultural associations run by the church and from the political activities of the Centre Party. The Polish minority, too, built a dense network of cultural, social and political institutions, so as to provide security and a point of orientation to their compatriots, who lived predominantly in the Ruhr district.

Migrants, whether German or Polish, only accepted their new, unsettling surroundings by stages, and the greater the transformation in their accustomed way of life the more

closely they banded together in the private sphere, living according to the traditional values of the society from which they came. This led to a characteristic gulf between the world the new arrivals now inhabited and the cultural orientation they drew on for protection. This cultural and mental reinsurance was chiefly implemented through rules and conceptions relating to the family, marriage and sexuality as well as through definitions of normality. These rules gained a large part of their legitimacy from the existence of allegedly centuries-old traditions and values inherited from past generations. In many cases the old values were idealised images of a tradition that was now under threat. It had to be restored and firmly anchored as a bulwark against the onslaught of the new world by the use of severe sanctions. But the idealised character of the old values did not impair their effectiveness.³⁶

The interaction between social upheaval and a renewed focus on traditional values was particularly marked in the youth movement. This was initially a part of the much broader contemporary movement for 'life reform' (*Lebensreform*). The life reformers felt the world of the Wilhelmine Empire to be restrictive and oppressive, and they strove to find a new and distinctive path of their own, to search for freedom, nature and the primitive, and to break free from the shackles of convention. The impact of these aspirations was felt as strongly in the fields of housing and urban development as it was in education and sexual politics. But the youth movement was even broader than this, and its objectives were also more diffuse than those of the life reformers. Above all, though, it exerted a great deal of influence, which lasted for several decades.

Its origins date back to the endeavours of high school students in the major cities around 1900 to free themselves not just from ties to the city, mass society and industrialism but also from parents seen as narrow-minded and authoritarian and schools where learning was crammed down their throats. They aspired to join with kindred spirits to find a way back to nature, comradeship, and a life unfettered by convention. The main features of this rapidly growing movement among middle-class youth were walking tours through what was assumed to be a primal natural world, a simple life far from civilisation, sleeping by camp fires under the open sky, a glorification of folkways, midsummer celebrations following old Germanic customs, and enthusiasm for a romantically imagined Middle Ages. The movement reached its zenith in 1913 when thousands of members assembled on the summit of the Hoher Meißner and in an emotion-laden ceremony committed themselves to 'shape their lives by their own decision, on their own responsibility, and with inner truthfulness.'³⁷

Activities of this kind may often have been limited to weekend or Sunday excursions into the surrounding woods, and they soon took on strange forms. Nevertheless, the youth movement's critique of civilisation expressed a widespread discontent with the modern, growth-obsessed mass society of Imperial Germany and a deep yearning for simplicity, immediacy and a point of orientation. These emotions were felt by many people who, weary of civilisation, fled from the cities to indulge in a cult of sunlight, 'life', health, and nature. They often had connections with the youth movement, which soon found a diverse range of imitators.

It was the ideal of 'youth' itself which occupied centre stage in this very varied movement. The decision to commit oneself to one's own youthfulness was seen as the real act of liberation. This becomes more comprehensible if it is borne in mind that in previous decades the role model for German society had been the mature older man. The Austrian writer Stefan Zweig, who was born in 1881, recalls in his memoirs that his school years were a period during which he did nothing but run the gauntlet as a punishment for not having grown up yet. During the 1880s and 1890s, he laments, 'youth was a hindrance in all careers and age alone was an advantage.' Thus 'in that age of security, everyone who wished to get ahead was forced to attempt all conceivable methods of masquerading in order to appear older ... Men wore long black frock coats and walked at a leisurely pace, and whenever possible acquired a slight *embonpoint*, in order to personify the desired sedateness; and those who were ambitious strove, at least outwardly, to belie their youth, since the young were suspected of instability.'³⁸

This was a time of change during which people looked for guidance to what was old and familiar, but the youth movement rebelled against this, seeking out new and more up-to-date examples to follow. These were found, paradoxically, in yet older and more original-seeming myths, the myths of the Middle Ages, and in Romanticism, and an archaic nature-mysticism. Thus the youth movement was an expression of two opposed phenomena: an increase in insecurity caused by the rapid and dynamic changes around the turn of the century and a rejection of the current ways in which people were reacting to those changes. At the same time the myth of youth reflected the country's altered demographic structure. Never before had the proportion of young people in the total population been as high as it was at this time, and this was particularly evident in the new urban centres, with their very high proportion of recently-arrived workers.

The avantgarde artists were even stronger supporters of radical change than the members of the youth movement, with which they were associated in various ways. The radicalism of their works and their mode of life expressed the extent and depth of the social

changes that were under way. It also mirrored the inner turmoil of the epoch. For on the one hand they sought and found in their texts and pictures new and 'modern' forms of expression, unknown until then and appropriate to the new epoch; while on the other hand their works expressed a sharp hostility towards the new urban and industrial world which was often more extreme than the experiments of the 'life reformers' or the youth movement's search for meaning. Needless to say, there were also intermixtures and transitions of all kinds to be seen. This was characteristic of the cultural life of Germany at the turn of the century, particularly in Berlin, which was an extraordinary kaleidoscope almost bursting with dynamism. But if we look beyond the multiplicity of literary styles and the unending series of shifts from one aesthetic school of thought to the next, certain clear trends are visible. The main stress was no longer placed on the social dislocations brought about by capitalism, as it had been in the heyday of Naturalism, a trend which lasted until the 1890s, but on the cultural impact of industrialism, which was regarded as retrograde.

The artistic currents which turned away from Naturalism came in many different varieties: Decadence, Impressionism, Symbolism, Neo-romanticism, Art Nouveau, Secessionist *Stilkunst*, and finally Expressionism. What all of them had in common was a rejection of direct social and political involvement. The problems of the great bourgeois ego now took centre stage. The autonomous artistic personality was pained by the unreasonable demands of the new mass society, and by its banality, and withdrew into a realm of pure and ideal art. This was intended to provide a basis for renewing the world through the celebration of spiritual and aesthetic values, and through a concentration on the individual and the community instead of on the masses and society. The new artists established a cult of the autonomous ego, of youth, of 'life' and of art itself in opposition to the conventions of bourgeois civilisation, with its stress on rationality, achievement, utility and technological advance.³⁹

This new artistic attitude can be met in an almost pure form in the works of the lyric poet Stefan George, who was at the centre of an esoteric circle of devoted young men. He preached a radical aesthetic of absolute art, and he 'opposed the epoch's lack of spirituality, search for a great man, mania for progress, egalitarian phrase-making, levelling of all that is great, liquidation of values, liberal-democratic mediocrity, and prescribed points of view' as well as 'the rule of "society", its banal rationalism, and its emphasis on individualism', to quote the list of his views drawn up by Thomas Nipperdey. But the literature of the George circle was also to a great extent 'modern' insofar as it recognised the emerging tendencies of the time, seized on them, and did so in new artistic forms which were appropriate to the epoch and were felt by contemporaries to be entirely revolutionary. In other words, this was a modern uprising against modernity.⁴⁰

These ideas were of course the preserve of small avantgarde minorities, as were the attempts made to establish new ways of living in communities and rural communes or to propagate a new sexuality. But young people, particularly from the middle classes, were enormously influenced by them. Not a few of those born at the turn of the century were deeply and lastingly influenced by the cult around Stefan George. The radical critique formulated by George and his circle of what the new world had brought forth moulded a whole generation's ways of thinking and feeling.

This is also significant because sections of the reform movement and the new artistic avantgarde moved on from cultural criticism to more strongly politicised forms of protest against modernity. They began to take a negative attitude towards competition, conflict and the separate representation of the interests of social groups and political parties. They were committed instead to achieving a harmonious and 'organic life'. What was understood by this was a life without alienation and free from any connection with the market, utilitarian thinking or pragmatism. This would of course need the support of a strong, authoritarian state: they would 'turn inwards, protected by the power of the state' as Thomas Mann put it much later on.⁴¹ The critique of 'trivialisation' and merely external technical progress, of materialism, alienation and loss of meaning also played its part here. The tendency which prevailed in this milieu was to make a sharp contrast between the autonomous personality and the rise of 'mass society', and to deplore the absence of tragedy and profundity. This culminated in an approach which contraposed community and culture to society and civilisation, and thus clearly contained the elements of a line of thought which was opposed to liberalism and directed against the principles of the Enlightenment.⁴²

Radical Answers to the Crisis of Bourgeois Society

The radical transformation the world underwent in the two decades preceding the First World War was perceived as a crisis of bourgeois society and a threat to it. This led, particularly in Germany, to the emergence of responses of an equally radical character, as reflected in the rise of the grand political ideologies which in the course of the rise of mass society mobilised more people than had ever been mobilised before. Modern ideologies are ways of interpreting the world. They explain complex relationships in an approachable and plausible manner, bring into relief obvious causal factors, and in this way offer a guide to action and a firm basis for conduct. In the period of time treated here, modern ideologies filled the gap left by the decline of religious attitudes. They were also

a reflection of the modern participatory society, in which the mobilisation of supporters in previously unheard-of numbers - through elections, through political actions such as demonstrations and strikes, and through the means of communication and the powerful mass political and social organisations which were emerging - became a political factor of the first rank..

The socialist workers' movement was an example of this combination of ideology, political action and mass involvement. It was both a social support organisation and a political party, and it gave its adherents self-confidence and a sense of security through the conviction that with Marxism they possessed an explanatory framework through which they could both analyse the processes of change they had just experienced and make reliable predictions about future development.

The success of Marxism in its popularised form depended above all on its ability to explain the workers' experiences of exploitation, discrimination and persecution as part of an eternal struggle between the exploiting and exploited classes, which ran through the whole of human history. Thus the theory gained historical legitimacy and depth. With the help of Marxism, the social and political discrimination experienced by the working class could be explained and the possibility of changing the situation demonstrated.

The efforts of the authorities to resist proletarian subversion by proclaiming states of emergency and bringing in troops confirmed the Marxist analysis of the class state and class justice and strengthened the socialist workers' conviction that their theories were justified and that they correctly described not only the present and the past but also the direction of future development. They were convinced of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms and the necessity of socialism, and looked forward to the utopia of a classless society devoid of both exploitation and social contradictions. This theory, which was a mixture of persuasive analysis of the present and political religion, gave rise to optimism and deep-seated convictions, and it laid the foundation for the close solidarity and spirit of sacrifice of the German workers' movement, which lasted for over a century.⁴³

Contradictions which could not be explained by Marxist theory, on the other hand, were negated. It was true that a considerable section of the new working class had suffered impoverishment, which was at its worst between the 1850s and the 1880s. But in the 1890s there were clear indications pointing towards a slow, but constant, improvement in social conditions. Similarly, according to the idea of internationalism upheld in the workers' movement, it was social and not national differences which dominated society under

capitalism. But in actual fact the socialist workers were increasingly gripped by ideas of national unity, and patriotic feelings for the Fatherland.

Meanwhile, practical politics soon softened the revolutionary perspective of the workers' movement, a trend which became more pronounced, the more the Social Democrats enjoyed social and political success in the society of Imperial Germany. Even so, the SPD still held onto its fundamental revolutionary convictions, at least officially. One reason for this was that radical rhetoric about the eventual achievement of an ideal society offered a perspective of salvation and therefore provided an important motivation for the workers to struggle with enthusiasm and maintain their sense of solidarity. Moreover, the increasing strength of the movement led the state and the political Right to take increasingly tough measures against it. This acted as a constant refutation of any suggestion that reform could succeed or that the political and social system of the Empire could be altered step by step. The intensification of political conflict after the turn of the century led finally to the emergence within the party of a radical, revolutionary wing, which consistently placed its faith in a violent overthrow of the system and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat in line with Marx's theory. This was the starting-point for the development of communist parties, not just in Germany but elsewhere too, for the Marxism developed in Germany proved to be highly exportable, becoming the theoretical foundation of emerging socialist workers' movements in the whole of the industrialising world. This applied particularly to Russia, for in their analyses of capitalism the Russian revolutionaries always referred to the situation in the developed capitalist countries of the West, Germany above all.⁴⁴

The strength of Marxism in Germany does not of course prove that social contradictions or the political oppression of the workers were particularly pronounced there. The opposite was rather the case: a comparison with the other developing industrial nations of the West entirely favours Germany, not to mention a comparison with the backward despotism of Tsarist Russia, among other reasons because of the early moves made by the German state towards introducing the elements of social policy. What strikes the observer is rather that the Germany of this era was a test-bed for modernity, thanks to its particularly successful and rapid economic, social and cultural development. In the 25 years between 1890 and the start of the First World War the country experienced the effects of a transformation which was rapid and to some extent unchecked. The brakes were off, so to speak, and all possible reactions and responses to the situation were played out in all variants and at breakneck speed. In the hothouse atmosphere created by Berlin's explosive growth, the newest variants of scientific, technological, infrastructural, but also cultural and ideological accomplishment emerged extremely quickly. Expressionism and life reform, radical nationalism and radical Marxism, the youth move-

ment, modern Anti-Semitism and Zionism, the folkish (*völkisch*) movement and the predecessors of the world communist movement, were all invented and tested out here almost simultaneously and sometimes in the same place.

Nationalism was the most dynamic and widely distributed of all these movements and ideologies. It had been an opposition movement in Germany until the establishment of the Empire in 1871. It had been closely linked with the struggle for liberal freedoms, democracy and parliamentarism. Moreover, at that stage it had not been tied to a nationally-defined state, being rather a cultural and linguistic phenomenon, which created an identity by self-demarkation from non-German groups and peoples. When its narrower goals had been attained, by the establishment of the Little German (*kleindeutsch*) nation-state and the proclamation of the German Reich, it mutated into imperial nationalism (*Reichsnationalismus*), thereby becoming the crucial mode of integration for a young, extremely heterogeneous and disunited 'nation', which now needed to tie together an amorphous and accidental structure by surrounding itself with forces of cohesion. What was 'German' was first defined by drawing a line of separation from what was non-German, hence by putting up a front against the Poles in the East and the French in the West. Very soon this external demarcation was combined with an internal one, against those people who did not want the nation-state to take precedence as the primary or indeed the sole unifying bond, namely the Social Democrats, with their commitment to internationalism, and also the Roman Catholics with their connection to the papacy in Rome. Moreover, the new German nationalism was also quick to exclude the only non-Christian minority in the country, the Jews. This led in the 1880s to the growth of anti-Semitic parties of a traditional kind, ostensibly Protestant in character, which soon disappeared, however, making way for other variants of the same approach.⁴⁵

Nationalism was able in this way to bundle together many, if not all, of the grievances and anxieties of the epoch. It combined regret over social fragmentation and political conflict, glorification of unity as opposed to multiplicity, resignation in the face of the complexities of the modern world, a yearning for simple explanations, anxiety over the anarchic tendencies of freedom, and a search for prospects of salvation with quasi-religious stability. At the same time, however, it also provided fresh experiences: the intoxication of a mass meeting, the newly awakened thirst for power and the pursuit of national expansion.

The foundation of the nation-state from above stripped German nationalism to a considerable degree of its critical anti-authoritarianism. It lost its revolutionary impetus and rapidly became one of the dominant aspects of the culture of the new German Empire,

which like all young nation-states directed its initial efforts at creating the oldest possible traditions for itself, to demonstrate that it was a 'natural' association, not simply an expression of political aspirations. Constant references to the German Empire of olden times were thus a lasting phenomenon of everyday culture. The cult of the German Middle Ages, the Teutons, the Migration of the Peoples (*Völkerwanderung*) and the Wars of Liberation was repeatedly called on to suggest historical depth and thereby provide legitimacy. Its effects spread far beyond the educated bourgeoisie, the social stratum that was particularly receptive to nationalism.

The new Reich German nationalism was a combination of pride in the almost unbelievable rise of Imperial Germany and enthusiasm over its economic successes and the 'international standing' the country had achieved. At the same time, however, nationalism became a way of escaping from the crisis of modernisation. In view of the anxieties over social status evoked by the rapidity of the transformation process, the crisis-ridden and unpredictable oscillations of the economic conjuncture, and the unhappiness produced by the consequences of urban civilisation and cultural modernity, identification with the nation offered people a feeling that they belonged naturally to a big, successful association, which could overcome inner conflicts and compensate for the impairment of identity, the loss of direction and the concern they felt over the future.

Soon the new nationalism started to turn its attention to the outside world as well: The rise in Germany's economic strength required, it was thought, a corresponding increase in its external power. The start of the new century saw the emergence of mass nationalist organisations, which agitated for the 'Germanisation' (*Germanisierung*) of the Prussian part of Poland, the expansion of the German colonial empire, and the enhancement of Germany's 'international standing' (*Weltgeltung*). These groups were extremely effective. Moreover, the ideological underpinnings of nationalism also began to mutate. The establishment of the German Reich by Bismarck had been directed against Greater German (*Großdeutsch*) aspirations, and involved abandoning the perspective of a pan-German state structure, but the period after the turn of the century saw the return of such objectives. The Little German Reich was no longer big enough. People now began to talk about a German '*Volk*' (folk), which was still scattered over various states and demanded unity.

There was a connection between the anti-modern movement and *völkisch*-nationalist tendencies. This could already be seen in Paul de Lagarde and Julius Langbehn, two earlier protagonists of anti-liberal cultural criticism, whose main works appeared in the 1880s and 1890s, gaining a wide readership. Both of them preached against the soul-

less materialism of advancing modernity, advocating instead a religion of spirituality and idealism which would draw its strength from the '*Volk*'. What they meant by the '*Volk*' was not the 'mass of the people' in the republican sense of the conceptual opposite to 'authority' but the members of a 'nation'. The category '*Volk*' was at first understood culturally, but its meaning increasingly changed so that it began to signify a biological, 'racial' characteristic determined by descent. With this transition, an 'organic', category of natural origin had been found which could be associated with the yearning for what was primitive and genuine and opposed to 'mechanistic' categories of modernity such as 'class' or 'society'.⁴⁶

This notion was also reflected in the new law on German citizenship. With the continuation of the economic boom there was a further influx of foreigners, particularly Polish workers, into the farmlands of eastern Germany and also into various industrial sectors. In response to this, it was established by law that a German was a person of German descent. It was not sufficient simply to be born in Germany. When the law was discussed in the German parliament, the Reichstag, the German Conservatives stressed that 'descent, blood, is the decisive requirement for the acquisition of citizenship. This provision is an excellent method of maintaining and preserving German racial (*völkisch*) character and German individuality.'⁴⁷

This definition of a German based on 'blood' and 'race' was also directed against the German Jews. The new anti-Semitism that emerged here was no longer derived from religious differences and the traditional Christian hatred of the Jews, but increasingly from the Jews' postulated biological – 'racial' – otherness, which was created by the assumption of the biological unity of the German race (*Volk*). This was clearly different from traditional anti-Semitism, which continued to rest on Christian anti-Judaism, and first drew political attention in the 1880s in the form of a series of anti-Semitic currents and parties. But while this political anti-Semitism appeared to decline in significance after the turn of the century, social anti-Semitism began to spread, and indeed it spread in social strata in which it had never previously played a big role, in particular among the educated bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and the artists, where it was combined with a critique of the civilisation and culture of modern society.⁴⁸

A very typical example of this approach was Ludwig Klages, one of the fashionable philosophers of the later years of the Empire. In his early twenties he came under the influence of Munich's Bohemian circles, and their star attraction Stefan George, and he soon formed part of the group of so-called 'cosmics'. These were people who turned against the modern-day world, seeing it as the locus of a decline which would culminate in an

apocalypse. They regarded themselves as the chosen ones, as pioneers, entirely separate from the 'insignificant' masses. In modern society, declared Klages in his early writings, people no longer lived their lives as human beings, but 'merely existed, whether as slaves of their "profession", exhausting themselves mechanically in the service of the big firms, or as slaves of money, unthinkingly devoted to the numerical delirium of stocks and shares, or finally as slaves of the frenetic entertainments of the big city.' These were conventional *topoi* of cultural criticism, but in Klages they were combined with an invocation of the harmonious but vanished world of the '*Volk*', with its festivals, songs and costumes. This had been replaced, he said, with 'the gifts of "progress" ... schnapps, opium and syphilis.' People now had to put up with 'smoking chimneys, the racket of street noise and nights as light as day' as well as popular songs, melodies from operettas and cabarets. Primal life, the life of nature, had disappeared.⁴⁹

But it was the influence of the Jews, an ethno-religious group which was alien to the *Volk* and derived nothing from its tradition, that had played a decisive part in the alienation of humanity from 'life': 'We consider the forces and creations with which the modern world imagines it has outdone the old one, including the much-praised progress and uniformity of civilisation, to be in essence machinations of Judaism' wrote Klages in 1900.⁵⁰ In psychological terms the Jew is the type of the 'modern hysteric', he is characterised by features such as 'a craving for admiration', 'vanity', 'crude external display', and 'boastful arrogance'. This finds expression in 'the rising flood of literature', 'advertisements', 'noisy newspaper campaigns' and 'the saturation of party life with highly personal gossip'. 'Here one sees the impact of a vivacity which is new and tenacious but entirely lacking in higher qualities and is carried along by the element of a degenerate Semitism, irresistibly striving to rise in society.'⁵¹

Indefatigable esotericists like Klages found the Jews an appropriate target for their fixation on decay and degeneracy. Similarly, a not insignificant part of the artistic avantgarde and the youth movement became tinged with *völkisch* ideas in the years before the First World War, incorporating anti-Jewish convictions into this mixture as well. But these notions were never dominant. In face of the multiplicity of politico-cultural movements around this time anti-Semitism was far from being able to play a determining role in cultural life. What is much more significant here is the way the critique of modernity could easily become linked with anti-Semitism. Indeed it also proved capable of making links with movements of other kinds.

There were many attempts to confront phenomena of modernity which were felt to be irritating and threatening, especially those that contravened bourgeois norms of behaviour, such as the actual or supposed rise in criminality, prostitution, homosexuality, 'youthful depravity' and also mental disturbance. One of the most influential examples of this was the spread of concepts of Social Darwinism and racial hygiene. Darwin's teaching, in its popularised form, appeared to provide a convincing explanation for these disturbing phenomena. Moreover it seemed to have a sound scientific basis, which was particularly important for an age which believed in progress and scientific advance. According to Darwin, natural selection was necessary in order to cancel out the imbalance between an excess of offspring and available food supplies. In the struggle for existence, only those who were most adapted to their situation survived, and this was the necessary condition for a constant improvement and development of the species to a higher level. This insight, according to which the reason for the evolution of organisms should be sought in 'natural selection', was later extended by Darwin himself to human beings, and then brought to Germany by Ernst Haeckel.⁵²

This was the point of contact through which the Darwinian model was transferred from biology into the sphere of human society, but with a significant alteration. Now it was no longer the best adapted who survived the struggle for existence, but the strongest. The principle of selection, it seemed, had determined the rules of human association since time immemorial. In modern times, however, the conditions for the struggle for existence had ceased to exist, because there were no longer famines, as a result of the modernisation of agriculture, for instance. At the same time, through medicine, welfare and social assistance, modern civilisation also supported people who would previously have been defeated in this struggle and 'selected' for their weakness. Through these developments, human beings had been exempted from the need to conduct a 'struggle for existence' and the natural law of selection had been set aside. As a result the number of weak individuals had now increased considerably, so that the basis of evolution, the survival of the strong, was rendered ineffective. The further and higher development of mankind, or, as the case might be, a *Volk*, was therefore threatened or indeed prevented precisely by the impact of state assistance for the needy and the weak, which had grown out of, on the one hand, the bourgeois tradition of humanity and presumed equality, and on the other hand the Christian view of the human being as God's creation.

This line of thought was plainly related to the progress of medicine and the movement for public hygiene in the struggle against the mass infections then prevalent. For just as it had become possible during these years for the causes of bodily illnesses to be discovered through scientific analysis, allowing their successful treatment, so, according to

this line of thought, it ought to be possible to use scientifically exact means combat the causes of undesirable social developments.

These notions emerged at the end of the nineteenth century in various different guises, and they were applied to a range of different groups which were seen as 'inferior', namely 'the feeble-minded', the physically disabled from birth, 'habitual criminals', and even the 'unloved' and the 'ugly'.

Thus the Munich doctor Wilhelm Schallmayer conducted a study demonstrating that the modern social system supported precisely those population groups which possessed particularly bad inherited predispositions and also produced large numbers of children. Similarly, medicine to a large extent nullified the mechanisms of 'natural selection' by successfully combating the most prevalent illnesses. This had worsened the hereditary characteristics of the Germans as a whole. In order to combat this, the birth rate must be increased, people with bad hereditary characteristics should be compulsorily sterilised and people with particularly good characteristics should be encouraged to produce more children, perhaps through tax incentives and social assistance.⁵³

Ideas of this kind were not restricted to the political Right. Alfred Grotjahn, who wrote the health section of the SPD's Görlitz Programme, said that workers who suffered from 'tuberculosis, sexual ailments, diseases of the mind, insanity, or epilepsy' or were 'deaf and dumb, crippled, alcoholic, infirm, or severely injured' should be separated from the rest and placed in asylums.⁵⁴ In many western countries racial hygiene and 'eugenics' were widespread aspects of socio-biological thought among social scientists, physicians and criminologists at the beginning of the twentieth century. This applied to Britain, the Scandinavian countries and above all the USA, where the Galton Society's postulates of racial hygiene, represented particularly by the eugenicist Charles B. Davenport, gained a certain amount of influence over American immigration policy.

Conceptions of this kind admittedly also met with determined resistance, both from humanistically oriented groups, which were also present in the workers' movement, and from the Christian churches, though in the latter case this opposition was intertwined with other notions. The churches saw social hygiene and racial anthropology as a part of the cultural modernity they fulminated against in their attempt to preserve traditional values and moral guidelines. The attempt to fight the 'pathological symptoms' of modernity with equally modern means can therefore be seen as an exaggerated expression of the social and cultural contradictions of the turn of the century.

In conclusion, the developments outlined here need to be compared with those in other European countries. This comparison needs to stress first of all what all the industrialising societies of Europe had in common. In France, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy and Great Britain we find the same search for familiarity and a fixed point of orientation in face of a rapidly changing environment, though its forms varied from one country to the next. The critique of modernity, life reform movements, the workers' movement, anti-Semitism and radical nationalism also seem to have developed even more strongly than they did in Germany in some other European countries, namely France, Russia and Austria.⁵⁵

What was specific about Germany was the intensity and rapidity of these processes. This explains both the radical character of the ideologies that emerged and the attempt made to give artistic expression to them. In most other countries, it seems, there were countervailing forces which weakened these movements, slowed down the transformation or limited it to specific regions or social strata. In France, for example, great swathes of the countryside were for a long time completely unaware of the modernisation transforming the towns, or at least they had far less knowledge of what was happening than was the case in remote rural areas of Germany. In Great Britain the change from an agrarian to an industrial society had begun almost 50 years earlier, and it was completed over a much longer period of time, stretching from the early nineteenth into the early twentieth centuries. Modernisation in Russia was limited to a few islands of development in a sea of rural backwardness. It quickly became apparent that since the final years of the nineteenth century the role of laboratory of modernity had been taken over from Great Britain by Germany. The course of German development was correspondingly diverse, dynamic and crisis-ridden.

This phase of German history has exerted an extraordinary fascination right up to the present day. The society was bursting with vitality and a sense of novelty. Germany had developed in a very short time from a country which was in many respects backward and permeated by agricultural influence into a continentally dominant economic power, leading the world in almost all economic, scientific and technological spheres. It had also proposed, tried out, discussed and tested almost all possible cultural and political reactions to these fundamental changes within a period of twenty-five years. The ideological weapons of the gigantic political movements which stamped their mark on the face of the twentieth century took shape in Germany, as did the grand designs of cultural modernity as well as the movements that opposed them.

The yearning of the majority for security and fixed points of reference when faced with such dynamic transformations is completely understandable. Confronted with entirely novel surroundings, which were often perceived as hostile, they harked back to tradition, returning to cultural values which offered the stability and reliability of a past either already experienced or wished for in the future. But at the same time this reversion to tradition can also be understood as the prerequisite for a gradual process of integration, which stretched out over many generations. Beneath the shelter of a continuing adherence to traditional values, people could adapt themselves by stages to the new situation. Thus the period of rapid change which started in 1890 should be understood as a phase in a long-term learning process stretching out over several generations during which people altered their behaviour and learned how to deal with the emerging modern industrial society. It could already be foreseen that this would involve extraordinary crises, failures and constantly renewed approaches to a solution, though how profound these crises would be could not yet be predicted and had not yet been decided.

Right into the second half of the twentieth century the standard of prosperity and success for a German community was set by the experience of the German Empire. To quote one of its fiercest present-day critics, it was characterised by 'a high degree of legal security, rights of political participation equalled by only a few countries in the West, social policy achievements matched only by Austria and Switzerland, freedom for uncompromising criticism, some opposition successes, a liberty of expression limited only rarely by the intervention of the censorship, educational opportunity, social mobility, increasing well-being' and 'perceptibly improved opportunities for living one's life and participating in society'.⁵⁶

At the same time, however, extraordinary tensions had accumulated in this society, unavoidably so in view of the above-mentioned developments. How these tensions would be resolved was still an open question, which depended on very many factors. The first of these was the configuration of political forces which had taken shape in Germany. This would determine whether it would be possible in the medium term to establish a structure of political and social compromise capable of settling the social, cultural and political crises that were constantly recurring. The second factor was the economic conjuncture. The relative tranquillity of Imperial German society was clearly connected with the assumption that economic growth would continue, and that the situation of the lower social strata in particular would improve. Thirdly, and most importantly, the country's continuing prosperity was dependent on whether German society would have sufficient time at its disposal to pass through these educational and transformational processes.

¹ Helfferich, *Deutschlands Volkswohlstand 1888-1913*, pp. 6 and 123-5. In 1915 Helfferich was appointed State Secretary of the Imperial Treasury (*Reichsschatzamt*) and thereby became responsible for managing Germany's wartime finances. A year later he became Secretary of State of the Interior and Vice Chancellor, taking over the whole of the economic direction of the war. After the defeat he turned away from liberalism and joined the German National People's Party (DNVP), becoming a radical opponent of the Weimar Republic. See Williamson, *Karl Helfferich*.

² Conrad, *Globalisierung*, pp. 27-52; David Blackbourn, 'Das Kaiserreich transnational. Eine Skizze', in Conrad and Osterhammel (eds.), *Das Kaiserreich Transnational*, pp. 302-324; Torp, *Die Herausforderung der Globalisierung*, pp. 27-50.

³ For the following paragraphs, see Fisch, *Europa*, pp. 237ff.; Wehler, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, vol.3, pp. 547-699; Wolfram Fischer, 'Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Europas 1850-1914', in Wolfram Fischer, ed., *Europäische Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 1-207.

⁴ Hohorst, Kocka and Ritter, eds., *Materialien*, pp. 66-68.

⁵ Max Rolfes, 'Landwirtschaft 1850-1914', in Aubin and Zorn, eds., *Handbuch*, vol.2, pp. 495-526; Hohorst, Kocka and Ritter, eds., *Materialien*, pp. 42-44; Henning, *Landwirtschaft*, vol.2, pp. 113-174.

⁶ Wolfram Fischer, 'Bergbau, Industrie und Handwerk 1850-1914', in Aubin and Zorn, eds., *Handbuch*, vol. 2, pp. 527-562, here pp. 543-550.

⁷ Hobsbawm, *Age of Empire*, pp. 317-340; Tannenbaum, *1900: The Generation Before the Great War*, pp. 7-39; Romein, *The Watershed of Two Eras*, pp. 324-339; Wilhelm Treue, 'Die Technik in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 1800-1970', in Aubin and Zorn, eds., *Handbuch*, vol.2, pp.51-121, here pp.51-105; Wetzell, *Naturwissenschaften und chemische Industrie*; König and Weber, *Netzwerke, Stahl und Strom*, pp. 314-392; Sandgruber, *Strom der Zeit*.

⁸ Mann, ed., *Medizin, Naturwissenschaft, Technik*, pp. 52-68; Woller, *Aufbruch ins Heute*, pp.118-159.

⁹ Ben-David, *The Scientist's Role in Society*, pp. 188-9.

¹⁰ McClelland, *State, Society and University*, pp. 233-340; Konrad Jarausch, 'Universität und Hochschule', in Berg, ed., *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte*, vol.4, pp. 313-345.

¹¹ Siegrist, Kaelble and Kocka, eds., *Europäische Konsumgeschichte*, pp. 245-266; Möser, *Geschichte des Autos*, pp. 67-86; Thomas, *Telefonieren in Deutschland*, pp.55-138; Elsaesser, *Filmgeschichte*, pp. 94-124.

¹² Marschalck, *Bevölkerungsgeschichte*, pp. 27-52; Brüggemeier, *Leben vor Ort*; Bade, *Vom Auswanderungsland zum Einwanderungsland?*, pp.17-28; Mommsen, *Bürgerstolz und Weltmachtstreben*, pp. 62-67.

¹³ Krabbe, *Die deutsche Stadt*, pp.68-98; Reulecke, *Geschichte der Urbanisierung*, pp. 68-146; Hohorst, Kocka and Ritter, eds., *Materialien*, pp. 15-56.

¹⁴ Kocka, ed., *Bürgertum im 19. Jahrhundert*, vol.2, in particular the articles 'Wirtschaftsbürger und Bildungsbürger', pp. 9-34 and 'Bürger und Bürgerlichkeit', pp.101-120; Blackbourne and Evans, eds., *The German Bourgeoisie*, pp. 1-45.

¹⁵ Ritter and Tenfelde, *Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, pp.467-536; Langewiesche and Schönhoven, eds., *Arbeiter in Deutschland*, pp. 7-36.

¹⁶ Ritter and Tenfelde, *Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, pp. 113-154; Hentschel, *Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik*, pp. 62-81; Rothenbacher, *Soziale Ungleichheit*, pp. 180-207.

¹⁷ Reif, *Adel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, pp. 96-99; Jürgen Laubner 'Zwischen Industrie und Landwirtschaft. Die ober-schlesischen Magnaten – aristokratische Anpassungsfähigkeit und

Krisenbewältigung', in Reif, ed., *Ostelbische Agrargesellschaft*, pp. 251-266; Wagner, *Bauern, Junker und Beamte*, pp. 499-526; Heß, *Junker und bürgerliche Großgrundbesitzer*, pp. 27-42.

¹⁸ Max Rolfes, 'Landwirtschaft 1830-1914', in Aubin and Zorn, eds., *Handbuch*, vol.2, pp.495-526; Wolfgang Kaschuba, 'Peasants and Others. The Historical Contours of Village Class Society', in Evans and Lee, eds., *The German Peasantry*, pp. 235-264; Hans-Jürgen Puhle, 'Lords and Peasants in the Kaiserreich', in Moeller, ed., *Peasants and Lords*, pp. 81-109; Henning, *Landwirtschaft und ländliche Gesellschaft*, vol.2, pp. 113-174.

¹⁹ Weber, *Die Lage der Landarbeiter*, pp. 68-108; Kocka, *Arbeitsverhältnisse und Arbeiterexistenzen*, pp. 147-219; Plaul, *Landarbeiterleben*, pp. 147-278; Jacobeit, Mooser and Sträth, eds., *Idylle oder Aufbruch?*, pp. 263-276.

²⁰ Fisch, *Europa*, pp.236-271.

²¹ Mark Twain, 'The German Chicago', in *The £1,000,000 Bank-Note and Other New Stories*, 1996 [1893], p. 210.

²² Rehbein, *Leben eines Landarbeiters*, p.65.

²³ Alexander Granach (Jessaia Gronach), *Da geht ein Mensch. Roman eines Lebens*, quoted in Glatzer, *Das Wilhelminische Berlin*, p.128.

²⁴ Siemens, *Zeitalter*, pp. 95-6.

²⁵ Krafft-Ebing, *Nervosität und neurasthenische Zustände*, p.10; Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, pp. 170-172; Radkau, *Das Zeitalter der Nervosität*, pp. 19-73; Nolte, *Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft*, pp. 61-77; Borscheid, *Der Tempo-Virus*, pp. 215-238.

²⁶ Bollenbeck, *Tradition, Avantgarde, Reaktion*, pp. 99-193; Hepp, *Avantgarde*; Bergmann, *Agrarromantik und Großstadtfeindschaft*, pp. 33-173; Beßlich, *Wege in den 'Kulturkrieg'*, pp. 1-44.

²⁷ Rohkramer, *Eine andere Moderne*, pp. 217-342.

²⁸ Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918*, vol.1, pp. 428-530; Marbach, *Säkularisierung und sozialer Wandel*, pp. 41-90.

²⁹ Sieder, *Sozialgeschichte der Familie*, pp.125-145; Borsched and Teuteberg, eds., *Ehe, Liebe, Tod*, pp. 66-79; Klaus Saul et al., eds., *Arbeiterfamilien im Kaiserreich*, pp.5-68; Eric Hobsbawm, 'Kultur und Geschlecht im europäischen Bürgertum', in Frevert, ed., *Bürgerinnen und Bürger*, pp. 175-189; Mitterauer, *Sozialgeschichte der Jugend*, pp. 96-161; Buske, *Fräulein Mutter und ihr Bastard*, pp. 31-88.

³⁰ Stümke, *Homosexuelle in Deutschland*, pp. 21-52; Michael Kandora, 'Homosexualität und Sit tengesetz', in Herbert, ed., *Wandlungsprozesse*, pp. 379-401; Hommen, *Sittlichkeitsverbrechen*, pp. 23-34; Blasius, *Ehescheidungen in Deutschland*, pp. 127-154; Mosse, *Nationalismus und Sexualität*, pp.63-83.

³¹ Huret, *Berlin um Neunzehnhundert*, p. 76.

³² Clark, *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, pp. 80-224; Straub, *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, pp. 131-184.

³³ John, *Reserveoffizierskorps*, pp. 279-340; Rohkrämer, *Militarismus*, pp. 83-174; Frevert, *Die kasernierte Nation*, pp. 139-301.

³⁴ Ritter and Tenfelde, *Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, pp. 86-94; Tenfelde, *Arbeiter und Arbeiterbewegung*, pp. 13-62.

³⁵ Granach, *Da geht ein Mensch*, pp. 185-198.

³⁶ Kleßmann, *Polnische Bergarbeiter*; Herbert, *Geschichte der Ausländerpolitik*, pp. 74-84; Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact*, pp. 436-442; Hoerder and Nagler, eds., *People in Transit*, pp. 127-226.

-
- ³⁷ Knud Ahlborn, 'Das Meißnerfest der Freideutschen Jugend [1913]', in Kindt, ed., *Grundschriften*, pp. 105-115, quoted on p.109; Herrmann, ed., *'Mit uns zieht die neue Zeit ...'*; Laqueur, *Young Germany*; Koebner, Janz and Trommler, eds., *Mythos Jugend*; Detlev Peukert, "'Mit uns zieht die neue Zeit!"; Jugend zwischen Disziplinierung und Revolte', in Nitschke et al., eds., *Jahrhundertwende*, vol.1, pp. 176-202,
- ³⁸ Zweig, *The World of Yesterday*, p.37.
- ³⁹ Anz and Stark, eds., *Expressionismus*; Helmut Kreuzer, 'Eine Epoche des Übergangs', in Kreuzer, ed., *Jahrhundertende – Jahrhundertwende*, pp. 1-32; Bollenbeck, *Tradition, Avantgarde, Reaktion*, pp. 99-193.
- ⁴⁰ Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte 1866-1918*, vol.1, p. 782; Breuer, *Ästhetischer Fundamentalismus*, pp. 21-94; Karlauf, *Stefan George*, pp. 253-462; Raulff, *Kreis ohne Meister*, pp. 9-29.
- ⁴¹ Thomas Mann, 'Leiden und Größe Richard Wagners' [1933] in Thomas Mann, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol.10, pp. 346-409. The quotation is from p. 402.
- ⁴² Hepp, *Avantgarde*; Rohkrämer, *Eine andere Moderne*, pp. 37-116; Beßlich, *Wege in den 'Kulturkrieg'*, pp. 119-191; Stern, *Kulturpessimismus*, pp. 127-222; Bollenbeck, *Tradition, Avantgarde, Reaktion*, pp. 11-43.
- ⁴³ Kuhn, *Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung*, pp. 90-106; Ritter and Tenfelde, *Arbeiter im Deutschen Kaiserreich*, pp. 679-780.
- ⁴⁴ Hildermeier, *Geschichte der Sowjetunion*, pp. 44-47 and 178-182.
- ⁴⁵ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 101-130; Wehler, *Nationalismus*, pp. 62-89; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 50-66.
- ⁴⁶ Stern, *Kulturpessimismus* pp. 24-222; Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology*; Hein, *Die Brücke ins Geisterreich*, pp. 132-195
- ⁴⁷ *Verhandlungen des Reichstags, Stenographische Berichte*, 290 (1913), p. 5,282; Gosewinkel, *Einbürgern und Ausschließen*, pp. 278-294; Herbert, *Ausländerpolitik*, pp. 68-73.
- ⁴⁸ Karády, *Juden in der europäischen Moderne*, pp. 174-202; Volkov, *Deutsche Juden*, pp. 1-8; Lowenstein et al., *Umstrittene Integration*, pp. 193-277; Herbert, *Ausländerpolitik*, pp. 68-73.
- ⁴⁹ Ludwig Klages, 'Mensch und Erde' [1913], in Klages, *Sämtliche Werke, Philosophie III*, vol.3, pp. 614-636, here pp. 616, 621 and 623; Lieber, *Kulturkritik und Lebensphilosophie*; Schröder, *Ludwig Klages*, as well as Brinkmann, *Ludwig Klages*, and Leo, *Wille zum Wesen*, whose comments I follow here.
- ⁵⁰ Ludwig Klages, 'Heidnische Feuezeichen. Aufruf zu Wahrung und Förderung heidnischer Lebensselemente' [1900], quoted in Brinkmann, *Ludwig Klages*, p.79.
- ⁵¹ Ludwig Klages, 'Typische Ausdrucksstörungen und der hysterische Charakter' [1904], in Klages, *Sämtliche Werke, Graphologie I*, vol.7, pp. 83-118, here pp. 87-89, 92-3 and 94.
- ⁵² Darwin, *On the Origin of Species*; Haeckel, *Anthropogenie oder Entwicklungsgeschichte*; Haeckel, *Die Welträtsel*.
- ⁵³ Schallmeyer, *Vererbung*.
- ⁵⁴ Grotjahn, *Krankenhauswesen und Heilstättenbewegung*, p.4; Nadav, *Die Politik der Sozialhygiene*; Schwartz, *'Proletarier' und 'Lumpen'*.
- ⁵⁵ Fisch, *Europa*, pp. 297-301.
- ⁵⁶ Wehler, *Gesellschaftsgeschichte*, vol. 4, p. 203.